Now
Main entrance, 705 Pike. Let's go in.
Past the FedEx—the guys in there are great, by the way—and there's Espresso Caffé Dior on your right. Past the fountain, if they're open, you'll find Pike Heat on your left, Taco Del Mar on your right, and then The Stamp and Coin Shop, which has been here since the '80s. Bathrooms on the first floor are open to the public—one stall, half-height doors, because that's the one that's open to the public. There's a seating area usually roped off "for convention attendees only."
Keep going. Exits to the drop-off area on your left in the tunnel. All the way at the end, a commercial restaurant space. Unlisted on the directory. No name on the door. I've been inside—there's a bar with empty shelves behind it, like the owner skipped town and the bank came for everything but the fixtures. Next to it, the entrance to ACT Theatre—which is wrong on at least three levels. One, it's no longer an entrance, you have to go around. Two, ACT recently merged with Seattle Shakespeare to form Union Arts Center. Third, and this is the biggest wrong of them all, Seattle's theater groups are forced to merge to survive.
At the other end, the exit to Union Street. So if you want to cut through from Pike to Union, you can, and if you like, you can buy rare coins or get a burrito on the way.
Let's double back and take the Galleria escalators up. Second floor: SCC Admin offices on your right, seating area on your left. Keep going. Third floor: entrance to the parking garage—this is how you get to your car if you parked in the Pike Avenue garage between Terry and 9th. But we walked here, so we keep going up to Level 4.
Now we're at the top of the Galleria escalators. To your right, where a Subway used to be—closed for decades. To your left, the Atrium Lobby doors ---always locked unless there's an event--- and the doors to outside, which is Freeway Park.
If you're allowed into the Atrium Lobby, you're either directed up another set of extra-long escalators to the sixth floor, or into the Atrium itself, which opens to the 4A and 4B exhibition hall entrances. The Atrium is a big open space that usually holds registration desks. You register in the Atrium, we check your badge, you enter the hall.
But there's nothing going on today. So all we can do is look at the locked Atrium doors and head back down on the same escalators that brought us up. On the way out, let's peek at the Visit Seattle welcome booth. No event today, so it's unstaffed. You can pick up a brochure, though.
Thank you for your visit.
Status Quo
You just walked through a building that has almost nothing happening on any given weekday. The ghostly shell of a restaurant, an unused space that was once a Subway counter, a roped-off seating area, an unstaffed welcome booth. Five floors of meeting space and exhibition halls and ballrooms and a theater entrance, all of it clean and lit and maintained and most days empty.
The people on the second floor in the SCC administrative offices see the same building you just saw, and they also see the numbers.
The Arch broke even in 2019 as a single building—$37 million in revenue, $37 million in expenses, $74,000 in operating income.30 Then the Summit opened. Revenue across both buildings went up 58 percent, but expenses went up 103 percent.31 The annual report shows a $16 million operating loss for 2024. The audited financial statements—which include the $53 million in annual depreciation that the annual report leaves out—show a $69 million loss.32 Reserves have dropped from over $200 million to roughly $25 million.11 Net position is declining by $35 to $38 million every year, which means the organization is spending down its balance sheet at a pace that reaches zero within a decade.32
The people down the hall know these numbers better than we do. And in September 2024, the board made a decision about what to do about them. They conducted a national search for a new CEO and hired Jennifer LeMaster.33
LeMaster didn't come from convention centers. She came from the Georgia World Congress Center Authority, which operates what it calls a "Championship Campus"—the Georgia World Congress Center, Mercedes-Benz Stadium, Centennial Olympic Park, and the Signia by Hilton Atlanta.34 Her 26-year career started in college athletics at the University of Kentucky and moved through the Georgia Dome, where she managed $22 million in annual revenues and oversaw a $30 million renovation of the club seats and suites.33 When the $1.7 billion Mercedes-Benz Stadium replaced the Georgia Dome, she led public affairs during its development and then oversaw three rounds of strategic planning—Vision2020, Vision2025, and Vision2030—that repositioned the entire GWCCA campus from a convention center into a combined convention, sports, and entertainment destination.33 She was also the project development lead for the $520 million Signia by Hilton Atlanta, which GWCCA describes as "the first publicly owned, publicly financed convention hotel on campus."3334
That's the résumé. Convention center to stadium to hotel, each one publicly owned and publicly financed, each one part of a deliberate strategy to diversify beyond conventions into sports, entertainment, and hospitality. The board didn't hire a convention center operator. They hired the person you bring in when you've decided the convention center model isn't enough anymore and the campus needs to become something bigger.
Three months after LeMaster started, the SCC announced that its longtime Director of Sales, Michael McQuade—who had been with the center since 1988—would transition to a new role as Senior Advisor for Commercial Strategy, where he would "evaluate tradeshows, sports and special event opportunities for the city."35 The center simultaneously announced a search for a Vice President of Commercial Strategies with "a proven track record of diversifying and driving revenue growth," and a Campus Master Plan process for 2026 focused on "delivering clean, safe, and secure environments for visitors, guests and residents alike."35
That language is clear. The convention center is exploring sports and special events. It's hiring someone whose job title includes the word "diversifying." And it's launching a master plan for the entire campus—both buildings—in 2026.
That kind of pivot always requires public money. It did in Atlanta, where every major facility on the GWCCA campus is publicly owned and publicly financed. The Summit was $1.9 billion in public bonds. If the pattern holds, the next step is a feasibility study, followed by economic impact projections, followed by a pitch to the legislature or the county or the city to reposition the Arch for a new mix of sports, entertainment, and special events that the convention model alone can't sustain.
Maybe that's the right call. LeMaster knows more about running these buildings than anyone on this tour, including me, and the GWCCA model has been successful in Atlanta. But before that pitch gets made—before the feasibility study is commissioned and the economic impact numbers are projected and the legislative ask is drafted—we should talk about a different idea for what this building could become.
Seattle Commons
Here's what we're proposing.
The Seattle Convention Center doesn't need two buildings. It needs one building it operates and one it can access. The Summit is purpose-built for conventions—the ballroom the industry wants, the LEED Platinum certification, the exhibition space Visit Seattle actively sells. The Arch is a 435,000-square-foot horizontal building with a truck ramp, 1,500 parking stalls, 68 meeting rooms, a connection to Freeway Park, and a loading dock on the same floor as the exhibit halls. It broke even as a solo operation in 2019. It's been the overflow building ever since the Summit opened, and the two-building model is losing $38 million a year.
The proposal: the city takes over operations of the Arch. The SCC retains access for the days it needs it—conventions that require both buildings, overflow events, the handful of bookings that still need the Arch's exhibition halls. The rest of the year, the building is open. A public commons, operated by Seattle Center, programmed for the city, seven days a week. The 800 Pike building—sitting on regular land at 8th and Pike, with its own street-level entrance—is the natural front door.
That's the idea. Now here's what has to move to make it work.
The contracts. Four exclusive national contractors—Aramark for food, Encore for AV, Smart City for WiFi, Edlen for power—control the Arch's revenue model and make the building unaffordable for anyone who isn't running a multi-day convention. Aramark alone is $38 million a year in food service revenue, the SCC's single largest line item. Their contract expires January 2, 2027. That's the hinge. If the board exercises its renewal option, the building stays locked into convention-only food service until roughly 2029. If the board doesn't renew, January 2, 2027 is the opening. The exclusive catering model goes away. A food hall replaces captive catering. The price of hosting a hundred-person event starts dropping toward the marginal cost of the room. The other exclusive contracts—Encore, Smart City, Edlen—have their own timelines, and unwinding them follows as those terms expire or are renegotiated. But Aramark is the first domino. Once the food monopoly breaks, the building becomes a different kind of space.
The staff. The Arch has union staff—security, maintenance, operations, the people who keep the building running. A Commons needs every one of them, and it needs them full-time, not on the event-day scheduling that leaves workers underemployed between conventions. Year-round programming means year-round shifts. That's more union hours, not fewer. What goes away, over time, is the contractor layer—and what replaces it is a food hall with independent operators, built-in AV, and open WiFi. The union jobs stay and get better. The contractor monopolies end.
The operator. Seattle Center already runs the Armory food hall, McCaw Hall, KEXP, MoPOP, and the Space Needle campus. They program events, manage vendors, handle crowds, maintain public buildings, and do it 365 days a year. That's the job. The Arch is a better building for it than anything Seattle Center currently operates—horizontal, transit-connected, adjacent to a park, with commercial kitchens, loading docks, and meeting rooms already built. Seattle Center doesn't need to build anything. It needs to open what's there.
The money. The convention center's $1.9 billion in bonds are secured by lodging tax revenue—a 7 percent tax on hotel rooms in Seattle and 2.8 percent in King County. Here's what matters: the bonds are not secured by the buildings. The bondholders' claim is on the tax stream, not on the Arch. Separating the Arch from the PFD's operations doesn't impair their collateral. The tax is collected on hotel rooms whether the Arch hosts conventions or a food hall.
What the bondholders get is safer paper. A convention center burning $38 million a year in net position, with reserves dropping from $200 million to $25 million, is a deteriorating credit. A restructured operation—Summit handling conventions, the Arch's operating costs off the PFD's books—stabilizes the balance sheet. That's better for the bonds.
It's also better for the city. Right now, if SCC can't service its debt, the public is on the hook through the lodging tax backstop. Fewer buildings on the PFD's books, less exposure. Yes, the city takes on operating costs for the Arch—but Seattle is already paying for a dark building through lost tax revenue and a dead neighborhood. The question is whether you'd rather pay for an empty one or an active one.
And the hotels paying 7 percent of every room night get a return on their money for the first time. A Commons that puts daily foot traffic on the Pike Street corridor—past the Sheraton, the Thompson, every hotel on this walk—gives them something the convention model never has: a neighborhood worth visiting on the days between conventions.
The governance. The PFD is an independent governmental entity created by the state legislature and governed by a nine-member board—three appointed by the governor, three by the King County executive, three by the mayor. The same political actors who would need to approve the Commons are the ones who appoint the board. This isn't a hostile acquisition. It's a restructuring of which public entity operates which building. And there's precedent: in Tacoma, a PFD created a convention center and then delegated operational authority to the City of Tacoma through an interlocal agreement. The PFD retained ownership. The city operated the building. The same structure works here—PFD retains ownership of the Arch, satisfying bond covenants, while the city operates it through Seattle Center. No asset transfer. No bondholder trigger. An interlocal agreement between public entities that already share a board.
What we don't know yet. The bond indentures—the actual covenant language—need review by municipal bond counsel. Resolution 2010-12, the governing document for the PFD's financial commitments, may contain operational requirements that reference the Arch specifically. The PFD's enabling statute may restrict operational agreements to convention-related uses—or it may be flexible enough to encompass Commons programming. The Arch is built over I-5 on an air rights lease from WSDOT—the convention center pays for the right to occupy the space above the freeway. The lease runs to roughly 2050 and would transfer as part of any operational agreement, as it did when WSDOT cooperated on the Summit expansion in 2019. These are questions for lawyers, not for flaneurs on a walking tour. But the structural answer is favorable: the bonds are secured by tax revenue, not buildings. The governance is appointee-based—the coalition that approves the Commons is the same three offices that appoint the board. And the Tacoma model proves that PFD-to-city operational delegation already exists in Washington State law.
That's the proposal. The rest of this walk is the details—who goes, who stays, what the building looks like, what happens to the neighborhood when the doors open. But the structure is this: Summit stays a convention center. The Arch becomes a commons. Seattle Center operates it. The bonds get paid. The corridor comes alive.
THE KINGMAKER
Now the politics.
Seattle can't do this alone. The mayor appoints three of nine PFD board members. That's not a majority. And there's a harder problem: Bellevue doesn't want Seattle to fix this.
Every convention that leaves the SCC because of cost or dysfunction is a convention that might land at Meydenbauer. Every room-night that shifts east is taxed at 13.8 percent instead of 18, in a city that just expanded its convention center and is about to get a rail connection to Westlake, the U-District, and SeaTac with a transfer. Bellevue in 2026 isn't a suburb waiting for Seattle's overflow. It's a co-equal city with its own convention facility, its own corporate base, its own hotel inventory—and a rational incentive to let Seattle's convention center problems persist.
The governor can worry about the bond backstop, but the state's preference is to avoid writing checks, not to broker deals between cities. The backstop—a provision in the PFD's enabling statute that treats any shortfall in debt service as a loan from the state—expires in 2029. After that, if reserves are gone and lodging tax doesn't cover the bonds, there's no automatic rescue. The governor's incentive is to make sure that doesn't happen. But the governor doesn't run convention centers.
The only authority that sits above both cities is the King County executive.
King County created the PFD by ordinance in 2010. The county's hotels—Seattle and Eastside—pay the lodging tax. The county offered $100 million during COVID when the SCC couldn't finance the Summit. Sound Transit sold the Convention Place property to the PFD for $161 million—$20 million cash and a 30-year promissory note—and has a direct financial interest in the PFD's continued solvency. The KC executive appoints three of nine board members. And the KC executive has a relationship with Bellevue's leadership that neither the governor nor the mayor can replicate—because the county is the jurisdiction that contains both cities.
Here's what the KC executive sees: two publicly funded convention centers in the same county, taxing the same hotel base, connected by a twenty-five-minute train ride, competing with each other for the same mid-size bookings. One is a 54,000-square-foot facility that runs 300 events a year, stays solvent, and just completed a major expansion. The other is burning through reserves at $35 million a year, and its own CEO calls the situation fragile. The county is funding both sides of a competition that neither side can win cleanly.
The answer is to stop competing. King County Conventions: one regional entity, one sales team, one brand. The Summit handles the national-scale conventions that need 400,000 square feet—events Bellevue physically can't host. Meydenbauer handles the mid-size market where Bellevue's hotels, restaurants, tax advantage, and Crosslake access make it the stronger pitch. A planner calls KCC and gets directed to the right venue. The two facilities stop cannibalizing each other and start selling a region.
One CEO. One finance office. One marketing budget. The operations staff stays local—each building needs its own crew running the physical plant and managing events day-of. But the duplicated executive layer, the competing sales teams, the redundant back office—that consolidates. The SCC's operating costs went up 103 percent when the Summit opened because the organization was built to run one building and suddenly had two. KCC doesn't add overhead. It reduces it.
And who runs it? One organization has been self-sustaining for thirty years, completed a major expansion, and operates 300 events a year in a facility its market demands. The other took on $1.9 billion in debt for a building that came in $300 million over budget, watched its reserves drop from $200 million to $25 million, and is now exploring a pivot into sports and entertainment—business lines it has never operated, in a facility not built for the job, in a city that already has a stadium, two arenas, two major concert halls, and countless smaller venues. If a corporate board were looking at two divisions with these track records, the answer would be obvious.
Crosslake makes Bellevue a credible convention city. It also makes Bellevue the natural operator of the regional convention business. A Meydenbauer attendee can be at Pike Place Market in twelve minutes, at a Husky game in twenty, at SeaTac in under an hour with one transfer. The train does what used to require staying in Seattle. "Book Meydenbauer, visit Seattle" is a stronger regional pitch than two public facilities undercutting each other—and the Commons is what makes the pitch work. A living Pike Street corridor between the Market and Capitol Hill generates daily foot traffic at Westlake Station, daily visitors to Pike Place, daily customers for every hotel and restaurant on this walk. It isn't a competitor to Bellevue's convention business. It's an amenity that enhances it. The train connects them. The Commons gives the connection a reason.
Now count the votes. The KC executive's three board appointments, plus the governor's three—that's a majority. The governor's incentive is straightforward: restructure before 2029, or face a legislative fight over extending the backstop for a facility the market is abandoning. The KC executive's incentive is the deal itself—stop the bleeding, rationalize the competition, elevate Bellevue into a regional anchor, and resolve a structural conflict the county is paying for on both sides. The mayor's three appointments complete the unanimity, and what the mayor gets is the Commons: a 435,000-square-foot civic space on Pike Street, the companion to the waterfront, a legacy project that didn't require a new bond issue or a tax increase.
That's the coalition. Three appointing authorities, each with a reason to say yes. A regional convention brand that's stronger than either city's solo pitch. An Arch that opens to the public. And a KC executive who brokers the deal—not as a favor to Seattle, but because the county created this structure, the county is paying for both sides of its dysfunction, and the county is the only level of government with the authority and the incentive to fix it.
The PFD was created in 2010 for a world where Seattle was the center and Bellevue was the periphery. The region spent $3.6 billion building a train that connects them as equals. The governance has to catch up.